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ENCLOSURE D TO ITEM III, PARA B

SUPPLEMENT TO APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX C TO
JCS ARMED RECONNAISSANCE STUDY GROUP REPORTRT 34/35

RT 34/35, executed 1-14 October, involved fixed target strikes against two highway bridges (one restrike), a railway bridge, an ammo dump, and a supply area; US armed reconnaissance strikes south and west of the armed reconnaissance line (ARL); and VNAF armed reconnaissance strikes against the DRV LOCs between the DMZ and 19° N. CINCPAC subsequently requested an additional 220 armed reconnaissance sorties in order to maintain pressure on the DRV LOCs; 100 were authorized. SAM systems within the RT area were stated to be authorized targets for armed reconnaissance strikes as well as all previously struck JCS targets. In the latter case, the previous policy has been to designate specific targets.

RT 36/37

RT 36/37, executed 15-28 October, involved fixed target strikes against four highway bridges and a military barracks; US armed reconnaissance strikes south or west of the ARL; and VNAF armed reconnaissance strikes against the DRV LOCs between the DMZ and 19° N. Locks and dams were excluded from JCS numbered targets that were authorized for armed reconnaissance strikes, and it was emphasized that every effort would be taken to avoid civilian casualties. It was further emphasized that targets of opportunity, situated outside the authorized armed reconnaissance area within 25NM of the China border, 30 NM of Hanoi, and 10 NM of Haiphong would not be struck.

RT 38/39

RT 38/39, executed 29 October-11 November, involved fixed target strikes against two highway bridges, two railway bridges, a SAM support facility, and a military barracks; US armed Reconnaissance strikes, south and west of the ARL; and VNAF Armed Reconnaissance strikes between the DRV and 19° N. The

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purpose of the strike program was changed from "maintaining graduated pressure on the DRV" to "applying military pressures against the NVN through destruction of targets of military significance and interdiction of LOCs in order to make it as costly and difficult as possible for the DRV to support the insurgencies in Southeast Asia." During the period, CINCPAC requested 32 additional armed reconnaissance sorties which were approved.

RT 40/41

RT 40/41, executed 12-25 November, involved fixed target strikes against four of eight targets (five highway bridges and two railway bridges) and a warehouse area; US armed reconnaissance strikes between the DRV and 19° N. Under the purpose of the program "interdiction" was replaced with the words "continuing interdiction of major land LOCs from Hanoi to China." Also armed reconnaissance strikes were excluded from Vinh army barracks and targets of opportunity in the vicinity of the target areas were expanded to include units "which fire upon our aircraft en route to or from missions." During the period Lt General Emrick requested authority to restrike a SAM support facility which had been damaged only partially in a previous strike. Approval could not be obtained to strike this target.

RT 42/43

RT 42/43, executed 26 November-9 December, involved fixed target strikes against four of eight targets (five highway bridges, 2 railway bridges, and a SAM support facility) of which six were restrike targets and a military barracks; US armed reconnaissance strikes south and west of the ARL; and VNAF armed reconnaissance strikes between DMZ and 19° N. The restriction of dividing the armed reconnaissance strikes equally between the two weeks was removed. SAM suppression was included within the combat authorized to the MIG CAP and screen aircraft.

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RT 44/45

RT 44/45, executed 10-13 December, involved fixed target strikes against four of seven targets (five highway bridges and two railway bridges), and a military barracks of which four were restrike targets and a military barracks; US armed reconnaissance strikes south and west of the ARL; and VNAF armed reconnaissance strikes between the DMZ and 19° N.

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ITEM III "The ROLLING THUNDER Attack"

Paragraph C. "Present Delivery Capabilities of US/GVN Forces (including B-52s)"

1. Estimated sortie requirements and capabilities are currently under study by CINCPAC. The following information is submitted subject to further refinement based on the findings of the study group.

2. The current "delivery capability" of forces presently available in Southeast Asia is reflected in the actual attack sorties conducted during the month of December 1965. In addition to the total attack sorties shown for December 1965, a tabulation of the monthly average of attack sorties flown over the three principal target areas for the period July through December, is shown below.

a. Attack Sorties - December 1965


Air Force	8,436
Aircraft Carriers	5,207
Marines	2,103
VNAF	<u>2,589</u>
TOTAL	18,335

b. Monthly Average by Target Area - July-December 1965*

North Vietnam	3,244
South Vietnam	11,871
Laos	1,375

3. The current representative capability of 18,335 sorties per month indicates an approximate rate of 630 sorties per day. For a given period of time, a peak effort could substantially increase the daily sortie rate for priority missions or programs; however, the numbers submitted indicate a normal month-to-month capability.

* Time period includes stand-down of air operations in North Vietnam from 1800H, 24 December through 31 December and in South Vietnam, a 30-hour stand-down over Christmas.

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4. Prior to the stand-down of bombing in North Vietnam, sortie priority was: 1st priority - SVN; 2nd priority - DRV; and, 3rd priority - Laos. The relative effort expended in the three priority areas is reflected in the following percentages of cumulative attack sorties flown against targets in SVN, DRV and Laos during the period July - December 1965.

SVN - 72%

DRV - 20%

Laos - 8%

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ITEM V "Potential of Air Attacks as a Weapon to Achieve
ROLLING THUNDER Objectives"

Paragraph C. "Will of Regime as Target System"

Sub Item 1. "Prime Economic Targets"

1. There are twenty-four prime economic targets in the DRV including six industrial installations and eighteen electric power plants. Destruction of the industrial installations will have little effect on the direct war-supporting capabilities of the DRV, which depend almost entirely on imports. Destruction of industrial targets will, however, contribute to the achievement of certain US objectives which include imposing increasing penalties on the DRV for continued support of the war. Much the same situation exists with respect to electric power, over three-fourths of which is used by industry and about one-eighth by agriculture. Hence, destruction of electric power plants, either individually or collectively, would have little direct effect on the DRV war-making capability. Destruction of electric power will, however, have a strong effect in bringing home to the DRV leadership the heavy price for continuing war support.

2. Attack of all prime DRV economic targets will require approximately 202 strike sorties, plus 102 flak-suppression sorties for a total of 304 attack sorties.

3. Attached hereto is rough draft of a study on the DRV industrial installations. You have been previously provided a copy of the Joint J-3/DIA electric power study.

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